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Assessment of decision-making capacity (DMC) can be difficult in acquired
brain injury (ABI) particularly with the syndrome of organic personality dis-
order (OPD) (the “frontal lobe syndrome”). Clinical neuroscience may help
but there are challenges translating its constructs to the decision-making abil-
ities considered relevant by law and ethics. An in-depth interview study of
DMC in OPD was undertaken. Six patients were purposefully sampled and
rich interview data were acquired for scrutiny using interpretative phenomen-
ological analysis. Interview data revealed that awareness of deficit and thinking
about psychological states can be present. However, the awareness of deficit
may not be “online” and effectively integrated into decision-making.
Without this online awareness of deficit the ability to appreciate or use and
weigh information in the process of deciding some matters appeared absent.
We argue that the decision-making abilities discussed are: (1) necessary for
DMC, (2) threatened by ABI , and (3) assessable at interview. Some advice
for practically incorporating these abilities within assessments of DMC in
patients with OPD is outlined.
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INTRODUCTION
Assessment of mental capacity or “competence” is part of the medico-legal
landscape in many jurisdictions. Reflecting the decision-specific nature of
the concept, the international literature is increasingly using the term
“decision-making capacity” (DMC) and we use this term here. Clinical-
ethical research has started to clarify how DMC relates to the type of psychia-
tric or neurological disorder (Kim, 2010; Owen, Freyenhagen, Hotopf, &
Martin, 2015; Owen et al., 2013; Tan, Hope, Widdershoven, McMillan, &
van der Scheer, 2008).
Patients with acquired brain injury (ABI) can present challenges for the
assessment of DMC (Masterman-Lister v. Brutton & Co. [2002]) (Rose,
2003). This is particularly true of the subset of ABI patients with frontal
brain injury and organic personality disorder (OPD)—sometimes called the
“frontal lobe syndrome” (F07.0; The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Be-
havioural Disorders, 1992). The primary tool in DMC assessment is the inter-
view but the forms of dysfunction associated with this group may manifest
more readily outside the interview than in it—particularly as impulsive or
unwise decision-making—and during the interview patients may appear sur-
prisingly unimpaired.
Clinical neuroscience may help. Indeed, it could be argued that human
neuropsychology was born with Harlow’s description of the effects of an
acquired brain injury to a certain Phineas Gage (Harlow, 1848). Since then,
a number of striking examples of changes in behaviour, demeanour, attitudes
and beliefs following damage to the frontal lobes have been made which have
helped refine the notion of executive functions (Stuss, 2011). Within such
functions, decision making itself has become a topic of considerable research
effort (Ernst & Paulus, 2005). However, difficulties remain in measuring
impairment in patients with executive dysfunction or OPD (Crawford,
1998). There is also the challenge of translating the norms of neuropsychol-
ogy, which provide information about the prevalence of traits and deficits in
populations, to the norms of law which relate to individual cases (Morse,
2010).
So although cognitive assessment is a valuable tool, for DMC assessment
in ABI it does not translate directly. This is particularly true when the
“appreciation” or “use and weigh” abilities to which the law refers may be
in doubt. Dreer, Devivo, Novack, Krzywanski, and Marson (2008) conducted
a study of DMC in patients with ABI reporting that measures of executive
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impairment correlated only weakly with a legal standard of appreciation
ability. The authors remark that appreciation remains particularly difficult
to model using neuropsychological measures.
A further challenge is the legal principle that a person with disability must
not be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he/she makes an
unwise decision—Mental Capacity Act (2005) Section 1(4). It is the decision-
making process that must be assessed. But in ABI, it is often the fact of
unwise decision-making that is the salient factor and significant concern.
How are unwise decisions made with DMC to be distinguished from
unwise decisions made without in persons with ABI?
Here we focus on constructs from the cognitive and social neurosciences
that seem to us to be closely allied to the “appreciation” or “use and
weigh” abilities in DMC. The first concerns awareness of deficit in ABI.
Awareness of deficit overlaps with insight—for which there are various con-
ceptualisations (Amador & David, 2004). We are using the term awareness in
the sense of first personal awareness. Lack of awareness of deficits can be
extreme, amounting to anosognosia, but partial deficits are more common,
particularly following diffuse injury or damage. One useful research method-
ology is based on questionnaires, with both patients and informants providing
numerical ratings of the same abilities and behaviours. Patients with ABI
characteristically tend to rate their own psychological abilities (cognitive,
emotional, social) higher (and deficits lower) than do the informants with
average discrepancy scores much greater than in healthy controls. Using
this methodology, a quantitative measure of lack of self-awareness can be
derived (Bach & David, 2006; Prigatano, 1992; Teasdale et al., 1997)
which correlates neuropsychological tests and other clinician-rated measures
of awareness. A similar discrepancy measure can be derived between the
objective and subjective measures of a particular function as described
above (Gilleen, Greenwood, & David, 2010).
A second research paradigm, which partly overlaps with the first, involves
the concept of “metacognition”. Metacognition has been defined as “knowl-
edge or cognition about cognitive phenomena” (Flavell, 1979) or “thinking
about thinking” (Frith, 2012). The core is ability to think about and reflect
upon cognitive processes (David, Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012), and a
body of descriptive research has shown that metacognition can be impaired
in ABI (Ciurli et al., 2010; Hanten, Bartha, & Levin, 2000; Langan-Fox,
Grant, & Anglim, 2007; Ownsworth & Fleming, 2005).
The aim of our study is to translate between these recent neuroscience con-
structs and the “appreciation” or “use and weigh” abilities in DMC law in
order to improve practical strategies for DMC assessment in patients with
OPD. The task of translation, or transposition, we took to be interpretative
and requiring close scrutiny of in-depth interview data from patients with
ABI and OPD.
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METHODS
A qualitative method was considered suited to develop concepts in a complex
area that remains only partially theorised (Creswell, 2007). The study inte-
grated clinical and phenomenological approaches with standard techniques
from qualitative interview research. Further details on the method are
reported elsewhere (Owen et al., 2013). Essentially, a series of open-struc-
tured interviews was used in order to gain insight into the patient’s experience
of making decisions under conditions of neuropsychiatric disorder. This was
used as a basis for interpreting abilities needed to decide for oneself—the
meaning of ability in DMC law and ethics. We sought abilities that may be
lost or at risk of loss and which are assessable at interview.
The interviews covered the decision to participate in the research study
itself and decisions concerning the person’s treatment/care. Two interviews
spaced across a few days were held, each lasting 1–2 hours. Recordings,
coded transcripts and clinical sources of information (which included collat-
eral sources) were submitted to close, iterative interpretative scrutiny.
Excerpts from the interviews cited in this article are drawn from a large
corpus of data. We used Atlas.ti software to facilitate analysis.
Sample
We followed the approach of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of
purposely sampling around six cases to allow in-depth study of a relatively
homogenous group (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). Six patients with
acquired brain injury (ABI 1–6) satisfying ICD-10 criteria for organic per-
sonality disorder (F07.0) and DSM-5 criteria for personality change due to
acquired brain injury (310.1) were recruited. Participants were inpatients in
neurorehabilitative settings in the UK except one who was on an old age psy-
chiatric inpatient ward. All had histories of poor decision-making and
expressions of concern from others regarding DMC.
Cases were selected without co-morbid psychiatric or neurological illness,
pre-morbid personality disorder or where alcohol or drug use were current
problems. Time since brain injury ranged from 1–19 years.
Table 1 gives characteristics of the participants. Attention, memory and
language performances were relatively preserved for all participants except
for one (ABI 6) who had memory impairment. Performance on the Hayling
and Brixton tests of executive functioning or the Dysexecutive Questionnaire
(DEX) was impaired but no individual test was impaired in all subjects. Each
subject spoke English as a first language; education, work histories and scores
on the National Adult Reading Test (NART) suggested average pre-morbid
intelligence. The neurological histories and neuroimaging reports indicated
damage predominantly to the frontal lobes. Each participant was able to
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TABLE 1
Characteristics of sample
ABI 1 ABI 2 ABI 3 ABI 4 ABI 5 ABI 6
Neurology Haemorrhagic
stroke
following
rupture of left
frontal AVM.
RTA requiring right
decompressive
hemicraniectomy and
evacuation of subdural
haematoma and
contusions.
Subarachnoid haemorrhage
and complications of
anterior communicating
aneurysm clipping.
RTA with
conservative
management of
closed head
injury.
RTA with
conservative
management of
closed head
injury.
Haemorrhagic
complications of
pituitary surgery.
Right frontal
craniotomy.
Age 80 25 59 30 45 50
Sex M M M M M M
Ethnicity White Irish White British White British White British White British Black British
Legal status Informal Informal Informal Hospital order
(from criminal
court)
Hospital order
(from criminal
court)
Informal
Hayling
sentence
completion
test
Poor Impaired Moderate average Impaired Poor Average
Brixton spatial
anticipation
test
Impaired Impaired Impaired Very superior Good Poor
DEXa
discrepancy
score
23 3 20 39 26 38
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 Continued.
ABI 1 ABI 2 ABI 3 ABI 4 ABI 5 ABI 6
Behaviour since
injury
Anxious.
Wife says “I’m
now living with
someone I don’t
know”.
Rigid,
swearing.
Crude sexual and racial
remarking.
Mother says, “Some
days he’s this person I
don’t know”.
In supermarket piled items in
trolley and became foul-
mouthed when suggested
he look at costs. Tried to
pay cashier with his bus
pass and falsely accused
cashier of trying to hold
the line up.
Sexual behaviour in
public. Exposed
his erect penis to
female
neighbour out on
driveway.
Slow,
perseverative
speech, rigidity,
indecisive. Set
furniture on fire
at home.
Confabulates.
Apathy.
Walks into the
bedroom of a
fellow patient
and urinates in
sink.
AVM ¼ arterio-venous malformation; RTA ¼ road traffic accident.
aHigh discrepancy value represents low insight into behavioural problem.
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express choices; information about the relevant decisions was easily commu-
nicable to the participants and retained for periods sufficient to allow
discussion.
Interviews
The clinical case assessments and interviews were conducted by GO, who has
experience of research interviews involving DMC and is a consultant adult
and liaison psychiatrist registered in the UK.
Research Ethics
The study received research ethics approval from the South East London
Research Ethics Committee. The Mental Capacity Act (2005) rules for
research were followed.
RESULTS
Awareness of deficit and thinking about thinking
Patients did show evidence of awareness of deficit and thinking about think-
ing at interview. This phenomenon is important to make explicit at the outset
and attests to the challenge of DMC assessment in this group and the pro-
blems that have been reported about face-to-face interviews.
The awareness could be extensive in scope: of physical problems ranging
from physical weakness through to non-specific feelings of being unwell, as
well as psychological problems such as irritability, disinhibition or even para-
noia. It was also surprisingly insightful and deep. A few excerpts from the
transcripts illustrate the finding:
1 ABI 4: I’ve got a worse temper.
Interviewer: More of a temper?
ABI 4: Well I used to have a bad temper before but I’d go all day long before I’d lose it—but
now it’s five minutes and it’s gone, you know.
2 ABI 2: I know I’m a bit crazy, paranoid about things like that. If you only knew the paranoia I
go through in case like people stole my keys and put cameras in my workshop and
things.
3 Interviewer: Yeah, what else changed that you weren’t aware of?
ABI 5: That I wasn’t aware of? Er . . . I suppose that . . . er . . . . . . . .[long pause] . . . how
disinhibited I was.
4 ABI 3: I get irritated quicker. Like “Oh, come on, let’s go”, you know? I’m like that, which
isn’t good.
Interviewer: Yeah. And that’s following the subarachnoid haemorrhage?
ABI 3: Yeah. I never used to be like that. I’ve got such a short temper.
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We also found evidence that patients were able to think about and reflect
upon cognitive processes. For example, excerpts 5 and 6 below show thinking
about one’s own cognitive processes with excerpt 5 also showing thinking
about the cognitive processes of others.
5 Interviewer: And you said at first you weren’t aware there was a change.
ABI 4: No I felt like myself but everything was different to friends. I didn’t realise . . . that I
had actually changed. And when I realised that I had changed I moved away. My
old mates . . . everyone knew me before, everyone knew me as I was.
6 ABI 4: Definitely. I’d find it harder to stick to stuff than what I did before. Before, if I decided
something then I could stick to it quite well, but now when people start to explain
this and that is better . . . I find that hard to . . . Do you understand? . . . I can’t stick
to things like I used to.
Interviewer: Yeah, I thought that might be. So there’s this sort of sense that even when you think
that something’s a good idea, it’s still difficult to commit to it?
ABI 4: Even when you’re adamant about something, it’s too easy to opt out of it.
However it was necessary to distinguish the appropriate engagement in
thinking about cognitive processes from the results of the process, which
may be error-prone:
7 Interviewer: And you know Dr F.—who’s my colleague here—he’s been listening in and thinking
about what you’ve been saying.
ABI 2: He’s probably been laughing at what a dickhead I am, really.
Retrospective, concurrent and on-line awareness
Often the descriptive data from interviews did not do justice to the extent of
the patients’ difficulties. To compensate for this we found it useful to draw on
an older research tradition (Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986, p. 326;
Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941; Lhermitte, 1986, p. 335). This focused on the
ways in which patients with OPD navigate what we shall refer to as the
decision situation. The starting point here is that decision-making does not
take place narrowly “in the head”; it takes place in the world, and involves
navigating a decision situation populated with options, opportunities,
dangers, temptations, and other people.
We have already seen that ABI 4 exhibited both awareness of deficit
(see excerpt 1, above) and thinking about thinking (excerpts 5, 6). But this
was exhibited outside the decision situations in which they might (or might
not) have been exercised. In following up with ABI 4, we asked him to
reflect on past decision-making episodes—in particular the decisions associ-
ated with his discharge from hospital. Here a distinctive pattern came into
view.
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8 ABI 4: It was really weird because in the hospital, everyone else was really bad. Like they
couldn’t walk or talk, totally mute . . . But I was fine, I was walking and talking,
and I thought everything was fine. And when I went home, I was like gone. I
couldn’t walk, couldn’t walk upstairs. I was stuck in bed, and I couldn’t talk, you
know . . . It’s nuts, isn’t it? But when I was walking and talking I was fine. Every
single day in the hospital I was asking if I could go home. “I want to go home, I
want to go home. I’m fine, look at me. You can see I’m fine.” So eventually they
gave in and said, “Go on then, go home”. And once I was home it was just
different, you know. Before that I’d felt like I was better, I was fine . . .
Interviewer: So when you were in hospital you felt it was all ok, you were walking around, you
could speak, think, express yourself . . . ?
ABI 4: I was feeling fine, . . . but once I got out of hospital I realised how bad I was.
Interviewer: Outside of hospital it didn’t work out?
ABI 4: No, that’s when I realised how bad I was.
Notice first that there is a sense in which this exchange itself exhibited both
awareness of deficit and thinking about thinking. Within the context of the
interview situation, and hence retrospectively, ABI 4 was showing awareness
of some of the deficits associated with his injury—specifically, the inability to
know whether he is really “fine”—and he was able to reflect on the process of
thinking that led to his decision to be discharged. But the account he gave of
the original decision situation itself is very different. In trying to orient
himself in the decision situation, ABI 4 lacked insight into his own deficits,
and so was unable to incorporate information about his deficits in the
decisions about discharge, support, and place-of-residence. ABI 4 was
himself clearly aware, but only retrospectively aware, of this deficit.
9 Interviewer: So this thing about not being able to see it at the time . . . not being able to see
something at the time. I guess sometimes other people can see it at the time, but –
ABI 4: Yeah if you’re outside looking in you can see things, can’t you, but on the inside you
can’t see it.
The exchange with ABI 4 suggested a first refinement in the use of “aware-
ness of deficit” as a category in assessment of DMC. At a minimum, we need
to distinguish between retrospective and concurrent awareness of deficit. In
order to be relevant to DMC, awareness of deficit must be concurrent; that
is, the awareness must be present at the material time when the decision
needs to be made. Merely retrospective awareness may manifest itself in an
assessment interview, but does not of itself contribute to DMC.
Another observation about this exchange with ABI 4 brought out a further
issue. As the interviewer probed the patient’s capacity to make decisions
about place of residence, the exchange itself took on the form of a decision
situation.
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10 ABI 4: I want to get out, have a fresh start where no one knows me, and I don’t know
anybody, and start all over again. Start totally fresh, start a totally fresh life, a
totally fresh life.
Interviewer: And when you think like that, do you want to do it by yourself, alone, or do you want
help from others?
ABI 4: Do it myself.
Interviewer: Do it yourself?
ABI 4: Yeah. I mean my uncle, when he got out of the nick . . . 9 years or 10 years . . . He’s
out now, he’s living up north . . . When I get out of hospital I could go and see
him . . .
Interviewer: So what you’re saying is that what you prefer is to start again, without any help from
others. That’s very, very different to hospital, isn’t it, where there’s an enormous
amount of help that you’re getting.
ABI 4: I don’t need this bollocks [hospital care], I’m sick of it.
As the patient was deliberating about what to do, his awareness of deficit
(and the associated recognition of the need for support) seemed to dissipate.
So even in the context of an interview in which he had shown awareness of
deficit regarding retrospective decisions, the patient showed an inability to
use that information to navigate the challenges of the decision situation
regarding his future. This in turn suggested that the relevant variable in aware-
ness of deficit was not simply concurrence.
The importance of this point was shown in an exchange with another
patient in the study:
11 Interviewer: I mean, for example, in the restaurant you had somebody kind of shout at you after
you got irritated and you kind of got into an argument which had got a bit out of
hand, and it sort of started because, whereas before you would have managed the
situation, now you lose your temper?
ABI 3: Yeah.
Interviewer: Can you think of examples like that?
ABI 3: Yeah it does happen. It does happen. [Noise from another patient in background.]
I’ll go out there and punch her on the f∗∗∗ing nose in a minute if she don’t shut
up!
Here, ABI 3 showed explicit awareness of deficit, and thinking about
thinking, particularly as regards control of his temper. But even in the
very act of expressing this awareness, he engaged in the behaviour that
reflected the deficit. Concurrence in the awareness of deficit may well be
a necessary condition for DMC, at least as regards certain classes of
decision; but it is not a sufficient condition. In order for awareness of
deficit to contribute to DMC, it must be accessible “online” as well as con-
current. That is, the awareness of deficit must be effectively integrated into
the decision-making process. For as ABI 3 demonstrated rather vividly,
concurrent awareness of deficit and thinking about thinking can fail to
inform the patient’s navigation of the decision situation. This was a
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phenomenon that we found reflected in other exchanges in the interviews,
particularly with research subject ABI 2:
12 ABI 2: Yes. Again I do apologies [sic] for it [swearing/racist and sexist remarks]. I apologise
every time—I spend two hours a day apologising. I just get bored with it. I know it’s
outrageous and disgusting. I know it offends a lot of people but I just can’t stop it.
This phenomenon relates to forms of anosognosia neuropsychologists have
attempted to model (Agnew & Morris, 1998). It also provides evidence of an
impairment or even lack in the ability to learn from repeated unwise decisions
or behaviour and adjust one’s responses accordingly, arguably an analogue of
perseveration—ABI 4 could not learn from the past episode about this need
for care arrangements (see excerpt 8) when it came to making decisions
regarding the future (see excerpt 10), since awareness of the former dissipated
when the interview shifted to the latter; ABI 3 could not integrate his aware-
ness of his bad temper in a way that led him to suspend his behaviour (excerpt
11); and ABI 2 reported he was unable to stop himself from doing something
he clearly condemned (excerpt 12).
DISCUSSION
This study has shown that awareness of deficit and “thinking about thinking”
can be present without being effectively available for use in decision-making.
We suggest that this has implications for the “appreciation” and “use and
weigh” abilities that law and ethics refer to and helps us to refine understand-
ing of these abilities.
What about emotion in relation to the decision making of patients with
OPD? Considerable attention has been devoted to this topic in the neuro-
science literature and an influential approach has focused on the so-called
“Iowa Gambling Task” and the “somatic marker hypothesis”. Emotion
(operationalised as anticipatory skin conductance), it is hypothesised, aids
healthy decision-making by providing positive or negative “biasing” of
some options over others in a gambling task and this biasing is
diminished in patients with damage to the ventromedial frontal lobe
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara & Van Der Linden,
2005).
Our data did not suggest that patients with OPD lacked emotion in relation
to decision-making in general. We certainly did not find the patients emotion-
ally cold in relation to decision-making, Indeed much of the interview data
was tagged using a “sentimental” code. But, consider this example from
ABI 2:
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16 ABI 2: When I was younger, like about 15, if I hurt a woman I couldn’t square . . . I used to get
a bad feeling in my heart, I just couldn’t do it. Now—I was trying the other day—I
don’t get those feelings. I just say “c∗∗∗”. I just don’t get any feeling that I’m being
bad or naughty.
Notice that ABI 2 was here reporting on the absence of a distinctive set
of feelings that had once served to guide and constrain his behaviour. ABI
2 was not lacking in moral knowledge. Retrospectively he was able to
identify and articulate what was inappropriate in his behaviour. But
moral feelings were reported as absent prospectively and failed to orientate
him to what might be regarded as the “value complexity” of the decision
situation. Similar reports were given by other subjects in the study and the
phenomenon is analysed further elsewhere (Owen, Freyenhagen, & Martin,
in press). However, our data were not conclusive here and further research
is called for.
Limitations
Studies using interpretative methods aim to be hypothesis-generating or illu-
minating in areas where measurement is inadequate or incomplete. In OPD,
where the gap between cognitive tests/rating scales and DMC is especially
large, and where guidance on assessment of DMC is sparse, this method is
indicated. Studies of this type are always contestable. Our small sample
was limited by including only male cases and there was no comparison
group. Although all cases were out of the acute phase of brain injury, there
was a wide range of time since injury and a diverse set of injuries to the
brain. Despite these limitations the sample reflected the kinds of challenges
this group pose to clinicians and courts and our method employed interpret-
ative scrutiny involving diverse perspectives. In depth study of real cases can
help illuminate the abilities relevant to the assessment of DMC (Owen,
Freyenhagen, Richardson, & Hotopf, 2009). This study has shown that aware-
ness of deficit can be present without being effectively available for use in
decision-making. Further research should develop tools to capture this
phenomenon.
ADVICE FOR ASSESSMENT OF DMC IN OPD
In light of these results we offer some advice on tailoring assessment of DMC
to patients with OPD. This is not a definitive or comprehensive guide but a
research-based contribution to improving DMC assessment in difficult
cases of OPD where tools to aid assessment are currently lacking or vague
(Freedman, Stuss, & Gordon, 1991).
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Following Kim (2010) we find it useful to divide assessment into steps
before, during and after interview.
Before interview
The law operates a presumption of DMC and there needs to be valid concern,
or “triggers” to initiate DMC assessment in the first place. What are the trig-
gers for DMC assessment in this group? We suggest that repeated “unwise”
decisions, or failure to learn from mistakes, discrepancies between a patient’s
self-evaluation of ability and those of others, collateral history of a “change in
personality”, and measures of executive impairment on neuropsychological
batteries should be considered as indicators of concern about DMC in
patients with ABI. These indicators will come from consultation with
others who know the patient. The difference between what the patient per-
ceives is the problem and what others perceive is the problem may track
the abilities we consider here but the discrepancy framework is insufficient
for determining whether or not DMC is present. DMC law safeguards individ-
uals’ ability to decide for themselves and an assessment must be able to dis-
tinguish between unwise decisions made with capacity and those made
without.
Other questions that are relevant to consider before the interview are: (1)
“What is the decision?” and (2) “What supportive structures are around the
patient to help him or her decide (e.g., communication aids, strategies for
compensating for attention difficulties, etc.)?”. The first question is important
to answer so as to give the assessment the decision-specificity it requires but
also to ensure that the assessor is clear that he/she understands what needs
deciding about well enough to be able to communicate it simply and intelli-
gibly. The second question is important because DMC law stipulates that a
person is not to be regarded as lacking DMC unless all practicable steps to
help the person make the decision for him or herself have not been successful.
In cases where it is uncertain whether decision-making inability is due to ABI
or to social barriers, it will become important to identify supportive interven-
tions for that person that might overcome the barriers before judging lack of
DMC (e.g., an advisor the patient trusts and who has an understanding of ABI
or the removal of an undue influence on the patient). Also, in cases where the
patient’s awareness may be expected to significantly improve with time or
with rehabilitation (Prigatano, 1999), it will be important to consider
whether the decision can wait until a time when the patient’s functioning is
more optimal.
During
The DMC assessment, for a prospective decision, should be informed by face-
to-face interview with the individual in whom DMC is a question. As already
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY 13
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mentioned, concern has been expressed by clinicians about face-to-face inter-
view in these cases because of the way in which the deficits can elude struc-
tured assessment. But, following our study, we suggest that the interview can
be adjusted to meet these concerns.
These themes can help orient the interview:
. Awareness of deficit: Is the person aware of deficits relevant to the
decision that needs to be made? Does retrospective or concurrent una-
wareness mean he or she is unable to understand or appreciate the rel-
evant information? If the person does have awareness of relevant
deficits, is the awareness engaged or disengaged from the deliberative
process? Is it online awareness? Is the person able to make use of his
or her awareness in the context of deliberating?
. Detachment and disengagement: How does the person respond to his or
her impulses in the context of decision-making and action? Does the
person show an ability to “disengage” an impulse in order to consciously
reflect? Does the person have the ability to resolve conflicting impulses
that may arise in a decision situation? Is the person able to use a detached
position in deliberation?
. Emotion: Considering emotion does ensure a broad approach but it
needs to be handled with care. Assessors may ask, in facing the decision
situation, to what extent are the person’s emotional responses suited to
the situation, given the values he or she espouses? To what extent is
the person able to use his or her feelings to navigate the value–complex-
ity of the decision that is faced?
After
After the interview with the patient, interviews with others will be helpful to
confirm or refute the evidence obtained on the abilities during the interview or
to highlight areas of uncertainty. Those areas of uncertainty may require
another interview, or more collateral sources of information, or trials of sup-
porting the patient’s decision-making. Like all areas of clinical judgement,
one stops the data gathering when there is enough evidence to form a judge-
ment when a judgement needs to be made.
If the patient is considered to lack DMC, consideration will need to be
given to it being regained, and the likely timescale.
Because the evidence obtained at interview is qualitative, we suggest con-
veying it in reports/written feedback using short extracts of dialogue that
show the abilities or their absence. This can be supported with relevant
evidence from collateral sources or from behaviour.
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